No, Boeing, an ‘abundance of caution’ is not good enough
For a major aircraft manufacturer, there should be a very clear and well-rehearsed crisis communication plan. Tony Jaques explains where Boeing went wrong in this crossposting from his Managing Outcomes newsletter.
In the wake of a major disaster, words matter. And for Boeing to say it grounded the troubled 737 Max8 aircraft in “an abundance of caution” was a particularly unhelpful choice of words.
Within just five months, two of the new aircraft crashed minutes after take-off – in Indonesia and Ethiopia – killing a total of 346 passengers and crew.
Four days after the second crash – when more than 40 countries around the world had already banned the aircraft and Boeing shares lost a reported $35 billion in value – US authorities finally decided to ground the Max8 and Max9 models. Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg said the company supported this step “out of an abundance of caution.”
But respected writer John Beveridge argues that decision was several days too late. “As for acting out of ‘abundant caution’ in grounding the planes,” he said, “the time for that was after the first crash, not the second, and certainly not after most other regulators had already acted.”
This silly phrase seemed to gain favour in 2009 when White House senior counsel Greg Craig explained that, following a technical mistake, newly-inaugurated President Obama would retake his oath of office in an abundance of caution. Unfortunately it has now taken root in issue and crisis management as yet another example of shallow corporate jargon.
Following any crisis, words really matter. Think of airline owner Tony Fernandez after Air Asia flight QZ8501 crashed into the Java Sea.
“I am the leader of the company. I take responsibility. The passengers were on my aircraft and I have to take responsibility for that.”
Or think of Starbucks CEO Kevin Johnson when two black men were arrested at a Philadelphia outlet while waiting for a friend.
“The way that incident escalated, and the outcome, was nothing but reprehensible — and I’m sorry. I believe that blame has been misplaced. In fact, I own it. This is a management issue, and I am accountable to ensure that we address the policy and the practice and the training that led to this outcome.”
Or consider former Twitter boss Dick Costolo after a particularly egregious high-profile troll attack generated adverse publicity.
“I’m frankly ashamed of how poorly we’ve dealt with this issue during my tenure as CEO. It’s absurd. There’s no excuse for it. I take full responsibility for not being more aggressive on this front. It’s nobody else’s fault but mine, and it’s embarrassing.”
No weasel words. No excuses. Just corporate and personal leadership.
The precise cause of the recent Boeing 737 Max8 crashes may not be finally confirmed for months, likely followed by years of damaging law suits. So maybe “abundance of caution” was a phrase chosen to keep the lawyers happy.
Yet for a major aircraft manufacturer – where potential design failures must surely be right at the top of the list of obvious crisis risks – there should be a very clear and well-rehearsed crisis communication plan. And the right choice of words should be part of that plan.
Last year a Centrelink office in Adelaide went into lock-down after someone reportedly dumped a white powder on the floor in a public area. Emergency workers donned full protective gear before identifying that the mystery substance was in fact sugar. In that case, evacuating the building just might have been a legitimate use of the term “abundance of caution.” Belatedly deciding to ground an aircraft after two terrible crashes was not.
This piece appeared in Tony Jaques’ Managing Outcomes newsletter. You can subscribe here.
Let’s be frank.
The time for caution is before sale, when Boeing decided to make important safety features paid extras.
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All of this is a side issue. The REAL issue is the use of software in critical areas, and furthermore, that “software” being able to override the pilot’s command of the aircraft. Yes, there have been many crashes caused by hydraulic and manual control cable problems, but these are MUCH easier to inspect and detect than millions of lines of arcane (and non open source) code. The previous generation of planes were forged in the fires of war, and frequently hobbled back with half their tails shot off and riddled with bullet holes. However, these new plastic planes run by impossible-to-fully-test software and systems are a catastrophe waiting to happen. As there has been no proper long term testing of the plastic parts, I am also expecting more instances of “sudden and catastrophic de-lamination” as those airframes approach the 5 to 6 year mark. You can “blue print” and x-ray traditional aluminium parts to detect incipient fractures, but there is no equivalent for the new plastic bits, or to properly test for all failure modes of software (or electronics). Let’s also not forget about the undocumented facilities now incorporated in many chip designs which the software designers are totally unaware of. The Intel Management Engine debacle (which allowed unfettered access to bad actors) illustrates just how little control the final manufacturer has of the parts they might use. I won’t even mention the stories about a certain large asian manufacturing country installing hardware back doors in their chips (and govts banning their use in telco industry). Nobody has *any* clear idea of the whole chain of events of any of those electronic death trap systems. Yes, as a veteran software developer (who has seen it all) and private pilot, I am quite scared to set foot on a “modern” aircraft.
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